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ABSTRACT
The influence of futures on spot prices is investigated in a two- 
date-one-period model with storage. The characterization of 
storage firms as hedgers is new in the literature and sheds light 
on the way futures affect spot prices in the presence of storage. 
The paper proves, on analytical grounds, a stabilizing influence 
of futures on spot prices when storage decisions are taken.
JEL 020,500 (*)
(*) This paper draws from my M.Phil. and Doctoral theses and it is a 
revised version of a paper presented in August 1990 at the Fifth 
Annual Conference of the European Economic Association. I would like 
to thank participants of the EEA Conference, Christopher Gilbert and 
Louis Phlips for helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper. 























































































































































































Models of commodity futures have been widely used to 
investigate the hedging and speculative behavior and the 
sign and determinants of the market bias (i.e the 
difference between the futures and the expected spot 
price).
The literature has focused on the influence of futures 
markets on spot price stability only from the late 
seventies on. The need for a joint consideration of storage 
and futures when analyzing this issue is due to the role 
that both play in the intertemporal allocation of 
resources.
Kawai(1983b) and Turnovsky(1983) develop multiperiod 
models emphasizing steady-state solutions. Non-linearities 
introduced by storage make it impossible to explicitly 
compare price variabilities in the presence and in the 
absence of futures markets in this type of models. More 
restrictive assumptions or empirical methods are needed to 
draw conclusions.
Storage is the important feature that characterizes 
the model presented here. The storage firm is a firm whose 
income is correlated with prices and can be characterized 
as a hedger: it can be thought of as an agricultural 
producer who has to decide how much of his crop to store 
and how much to sell. Anderson and Danthine(1983), 
Kawai(1983b) and Turnovsky(1983) present the storage firm 
as essentially a speculator. Speculation does not properly 




























































































generally store for hedging purposes as well. Allowing for 
hedging gives interesting results which can be usefully 
compared with those presented in the existing literature .
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 
2, the basic model for the investigation of the storage 
decision of a risk-averse firm is set up; in section 3, 
futures trading is allowed for and optimal futures and 
storage decision are derived to investigate the 
interactions between the two; in section 4, the influence 
of futures trading on spot price volatility is assessed. 
Conclusions and final remarks follow.
2 A Microeconomic Model with Storage
A two-date-one-period rational expectations 
equilibrium model is considered to analyze the storage 
decision of a competitive firm and to determine equilibrium 
relationships.
The time pattern of trading is as follows. At date 1 
the representative storage firm has a first and second 
period random endowment of a storable good. One can think 
of this endowment as a crop whose exact amount is 
influenced by previous decisions and by the weather. At a 
point in time 1+e immediately following date 1, 
uncertainty about the first period endowment is resolved. 
At this point in time spot trading, storage decision and 
futures trading, when allowed for, take place. At date two, 





























































































The decision problem described in this model is that 
of an agricultural producer that has to decide how much of 
its crop to store and how much to sell.
The basic model is a representative agent model with 
standard assumptions on aggregation. There are two agents: 
a representative consumer with deterministic demand 
schedule at each date i so that the aggregate demand 
takes the following form:
= A - ap^ i=l,2
where p^ is the storable good price.
It is assumed that the representative consumer does not 
store.
- a representative agricultural producer that has to make 
storage decisions1 1) at the first date. It knows the 
demand schedule and the distribution of endowments, which 
is the same at the two dates, i=l,2:
Yi ~ N(E(y), a2y) with Corr(y1,y2)=0.
These firms are competitive in that they take prices as 
given.
The following assumptions are made:
hpl: at each date there is a positive correlation between 
individual, y^, and aggregate, Y^, output which has 
the following distribution:
Yj, ~ N(E(Y);0y2) with Corr (Yx, Y2) =0 . 
hp2: storage decisions are governed by a quadratic cost
(1) The storage decisions at issue here, are taken only for profit maximization motives.






























































































1 ?c(s) = - d sz with d>0
2
where s is the amount stored by the representative 
firm in period 1;<2> 
hp3: firms are risk-averse;
hp4: firms have rational expectations on the price
distribution at each date; randomness in prices is due 
to randomness in endowments. 
hp5: firms have a discount factor 8.
All agents are assumed to know the model and to have 
identical information on the endowment distributions.
It should be emphasized that, unlike in the previous 
literature, in this model the firms are not pure storage 
companies. They produce and are simultaneously engaged in 
storage activities. This reflects the characterization of 
storage given in the more institutional type of literature. 
Williams (1987) introduces a convenience yield argument and 
transaction costs, which are exogenous in the present 
model, but still represent a motive for keeping inventories 
which characterize more a producing-storing firm than a 
storage firm represented as a speculator. This distinction 
is clear in Goss (1972), who characterizes inventories as 
carried by hedgers and merchants, the latter being "really 
speculators in spot". So far, in the theoretical literature 
the whole storage is done by merchants; in the model
(2) It is worth observing that were the cost function not quadratic, a futures contract 





























































































developed here the existence of merchants is neglected to 
stress the characterization of storage companies as agents 
who hedge as well. This feature will influence conclusions 
on storage levels and price volatility.
Under these assumptions the maximization problem of 
the firm can be expressed in mean-variance terms131. Keeping 
in mind that storage decisions are taken after the 
observation of the maximization problem of the
storage firm is:
1
(1) max + §[E (7t2/Yi) - - a 5 Var (7t2/ )  ] )
s 2
1 2*1 = Pi Yi - Pi s - - d sxz 
2
7C2 = p2 (s + y2)
where a is the coefficient of absolute risk-aversion which 
is assumed to be constant and bold characters denote random 
variables.
First order condition gives:
(3) Conditions for deriving the mean-variance maximand from expected utility 
maximization (i.e. prices normally or at least symmetrically distributed) do not hold 
in this model as in most models on futures, e.g. Kawai(1983a,b;1984), Turnovsky(1983), 
Turnovsky and Campbell(1985). The use of a mean-variance objective function which can be 
justified either as an ad hoc objective, which has proved to be plausible and tractable 
in futures theory, or as an approximation to a more general utility function, which 




























































































6e (p 2/Y1) - P} 82aCov(p2 ,p2y2 /Y1)
(2) s = --------------  - ------------------
d ’ d'
where d' = d + 82aVar (P2/y i ) and can be thought of as the 
rate of change of the marginal cost of storage in a model 
characterized by endowment randomness and hence price 
uncertainty at both dates. The equilibrium value of 
Cov(p2,p2y2/Yi) depends on the parameters of the model and 
the endowments distributions as shown in Appendix A, 
Section AIII.
Negative storage levels can be ruled out by assuming 
an exogenous positive amount of storage held for, e.g., 
convenience yield motives which is enough to more than 
offset any possible negative level of speculative or 
hedging storage. Alternatively, one can look at equilibrium 
levels of storage (see (2') and (5') in section 3) to work 
out conditions on the endowment distributions which ensure 
a positive level of storage. Yet, the issue will not be 
analitically investigated here since the focus is on spot 
price variability.
The two terms on the right hand side of (2) can be 
addressed, respectively, as the "speculative term " and 
the "hedging term". The first term explains that part of 
storage justified by considerations on the differential 
between the expected and the current price. The second term 
is a "hedging term" since it reflects the correlation 
between prices and endowment in period 2. It differs from 
the optimal inventory rules elaborated in the literature 




























































































Equilibrium solutions to the spot market model can be 
obtained substituting the storage function (2) and the 
demand function in the equilibrium condition:
(3) Di + S =
d 2 = Yx + S
where S=ns and n is the number of storage firms, and
solving for prices. The derivation of equilibrium prices is 
in Appendix A , section AI.
3.____A Microeconomic Model of Storage and Futures
The influence of futures on optimal storage has 
already been investigated under the standard assumption on 
the storage firm (e.g. Kawai (1983b) and Turnovsky(1983)).
In order to examine how firms' storage decisions are 
modified within the model developed here, when a
competitive futures market is open, consider the following 
modification of the model. Assume the model is composed of 
three types of agents: the two already operating in the
previous model, a representative consumer and a
representative producer, of whom only the latter takes part 
in the futures market, plus a representative risk-neutral 
pure speculator. There are no information asymmetries among 
the agents.
The assumption of a risk-neutral speculator can be 
justified on the basis of a risk-pooling argument and 
implies an indeterminate level of speculators' futures 
demand, Fs . In fact a risk-neutral agent will be always 




























































































agent is trying to escape. Hence the storage firms' (i.e. 
hedgers') futures demand is always met. As a consequence 
the market is unbiased, implying:
SEfpj/Y-L) = f
where f is the equilibrium futures price.
This assumption allows the separation of the price 
volatility from the market bias analysis.
To assess whether and how storage behavior is modified 
in the presence of futures trading, the maximization 
problem (1) is modified as follows:
1
(4) max (JCn + 8[E (7io/Y-i ) - - 8a Var (Ho/Yi) ] )
sf,Ff 2
n  ̂ = p-̂ f y^ - Pi^s +f FF - - d (s^2
2
7t2 = P2f sf + p2fV2 - P2f Ff 
where :
Ff is the storage firm's futures supply
and the other variables are defined as before with the 
superscript standing for the futures case.
Solving (4) the optimal solutions are:
(5) sf = [f - pxf]/d
[f - P2f] [f - 8E(p2f/Y1)] Cov(p2f,P2fy2/Yl)
(6) Fr =---------+ ----------------- + ------------------
d 82aVar(p2f/Y1) Var(p2F/Y1)
Equation (5) implies the possibility of futures 
trading inducing important modifications in storage 
decisions. The optimal storage decision now depends on the 




























































































There is also a change in the price sensitivity of the 
storage function. In addition there is no hedging component 
influencing the storage decision: when no futures trading 
opportunities are offered (see equation (2)), the firm must 
resort to the spot market for insurance purposes. In the 
presence of futures markets this function is performed via 
futures contract as formalized in (6) . The first term on 
the right hand side is a routine hedging one (i.e. exactly 
matching the spot market position).The second term is the 
purely speculative one. The third one is a hedging term as 
well: it aims at reducing income variability by taking into 
account the correlation between income and prices and can 
be referred to as a hedging adjustment term (HAT).
While (5) is a well-known result, (6) still differs 
from what obtained in Anderson and Danthine(1983), 
Kawai(1983b) and Turnovsky(1983) by the covariance term. 
Again it is the assumption on storage as an activity 
performed by the producer that makes the difference. The 
storing agent typically has to face a variability of income 
which is correlated with spot prices variability. Hence the 
consideration of this correlation has to play a role in the 
determination of either the optimal storage rule (no­
futures case) or the optimal futures position (futures 
case).
Equilibrium solutions to the spot and futures market 
model can be obtained substituting the storage, the futures 




























































































(7) D1 + s f = *1
°2 = *1 + Sf
Ff + Fs = 0
where Sf:=ns^. The derivation of equilibrium prices is in
Appendix A , sec'tion All.
4. The Effects of Futures on Spot Price Volatility
Having analyzed storage decision in both the no­
futures and futures case and having solved for equilibrium 
prices, the stabilizing or destabilizing effect of futures 
on spot prices is addressed.
As a measure of price volatility the spot price 
variances are taken. The type of price volatility at issue 
in this paper is the one measured by the unconditional 
price variance. By focusing on the conditional price 
variances, only the randomness introduced in the model by 
period 2 random endowment is taken into account. This 
implies that the firm's "viewpoint" in the time axis of 
trading is 1 and not 1+e. Conditioned on the observation 
of the period 1 price is non-stochastic and the 
price in period 2 is random only to the extent that is.
Price volatility at date 2, when the price variability 
is more complicated being due to randomness in both dates' 
endowments is first addressed.
The distribution of second period price conditional on 
the realization of Y^=Y^ and that of first period endowment 




























































































used to find the relationship between conditional and 
unconditional price variances:
(8) Var(p2) = EY1[Var(p2/Y1)] + VarY1 [E (p ^ Y ^  ]
(9) Var(p2f) = Eyl[Var(p2f/Y1)] + VarY1[E(p2f/Y1)]
Since the first term on the right hand side of (8) and (9) 
is the conditional variance which is the same in the two 
cases, conclusions on price variability are determined by 
the relative magnitude of the second terms on the right 
hand side of (8) and (9).
Substituting the equilibrium value of E(p2/Y1) and 
E(p2^/Y^) and recalling that the output distributions are 
not correlated, the following variances are obtained:
(10) VarY1 [E(p2/Y1 ) ] = ------ ----------------- (1
a2 (ad'+n+5n)2
82a aY2___________ i_______ ,2_ 2, A a Ya (ad1 +n+8n) +82aaY 
n2
(11) VarY1[E(p2f/Y1) ] = ----------- - aY2
a2 (ad+n+8n)2
Recalling that d' = d + 82aVar (p2/Y1) and taking into 
account that the quantity in curly brackets in (10) is less 
than one, leads to:
VarY1[E(p2/Y1)] < VarY1[E(p2f/Y1)] .
Hence we can conclude that the unconditional period 2 
price variance is unambiguously greater in the presence of 
a futures market.
The period 2 prices' variance is greater with futures
due to its dependence on output uncertainty. In fact one 




























































































(12) Var(p2) « Var(Y2) + Var(S) + 2Cov(Y2,S1)
(13) Var(p2f) « Var(Y2) + Var(Sf) + 2Cov(Y2,S1f) 
where ** here stands for proportionality.
Since it is assumed the two output distributions are 
uncorrelated, the covariances in (12) and (13) are zero.
Substituting the equilibrium solutions for prices in 
the storage functions (2) and (5), the equilibrium storage 
levels are:
1 5 - 1
(2 ' ) S = n--------[Y1-5E(Y2)1 + ----------- A +
ad'+n+5n ad'+n+8n
a5









in the model without and in that with futures, 
respectively. Hence the unconditional storage variances 
are:
n2 S2aaY2
(14) Var (S) = ----------i l -------------------- } aY2
(ad'+n+8n)2 a (ad'+n+8n)+52aoY2
(15) Var (Sf) = ------- oY2
(ad+n+8n)2
The storage variance is greater with futures than without 
since storage with futures is more sensitive to the first 
period endowment which at.,date>l is a random variable.
































































































, 2 „ 2 
\  °Y
(13') Var(P2^) “ Cy2 +
(ad +n+8n)2
A greater storage variance in the presence of futures 
determines a greater period 2 price variance with futures 
than without. This conclusion stems from the circumstance 
that storage, and hence prices, are less sensitive to the 
endowment variance in period 2 because of a greater 
marginal cost of storage (d'>d) and the existence of a 
covariance term in the storage function.
As for period 1, the price variance is smaller 
without futures since the period 1 price variance is 
determined by period 1 endowment and storage variances and 
the covariance effect. This covariance term is weighted 
with a negative sign since in period 1 storage is deducted 
from the given random endowment:
(16) Var (px) VarfYy) + Var(S) - 2Cov(Y1,S)
(17) Var(p1f) VarO^) + Var (Sf) - 2Cov(Y1,Sf). 
Substituting the equilibrium level of storage (2') and (5') 
in (16) and (17) respectively, gives:
(16') Varfp^Jtxa
S2
y ' t> L aŶ'* J ' 1 “ 2 a [a (ad' +n+8n) +82aav2 ](ad1+n+8n)' 
2n 82a 0V

































































































The sum of the second and third term on the right hand side 
of (16') and (17') is negative but in absolute value it is 
greater in (17'), the futures case. Hence period 1 price 
variability is smaller in such a case. The covariance 
effect in the presence of futures, overwhelms the storage 
variance effect and, thus, the total effect is a smaller 
price variance in period 1 when futures exists. A more 
formal discussion of this point is contained in Appendix B.
As in the date 2 prices analysis, this conclusion 
relies on: (i) d' bigger than d, (ii) the existence of a
covariance term in the storage function. These two 
instances increase the sensitivity of spot prices to the 
endowment variance in the futures case. Yet at date 1 they 
play a role in determining the magnitude (in absolute 
value) of the covariance between date 1 endowment and 
storage. This leads to the conclusion that the existence of 
futures lowers the variability of prices.
Summing up, the existence of futures lowers price 
variability at the date at which storage decision are 
taken, but increases price variability at the successive 
date when no storage decisions have to be taken. This 
asymmetry of the results on price volatility between the 
two dates results from the asymmetric nature of two-period 
models in the presence of storage.




























































































obtained in a two-date model, because storage might 
introduce serial correlations that are not usually 
captured in such a model. Yet, since a multiperiod 
framework is characterized by the simultaneity of storage 
and futures decision at any date, period 1 result would 
point in the direction of a stabilizing influence of 
futures on spot prices. When storage decisions are taken, 
the covariance effect between the endowment in that period 
and storage offsets the endowment variance effect more 
heavily in the futures case. This is due to the existence 
of futures that changes, in the direction of an increase, 
the price sensitivity of the inventory demand function.
5. Conclusions
On the basis of a two-date-one-period model of futures 
for a storable commodity, the existence of a stabilizing 
influence of futures on spot prices when storage decisions 
are taken is proved.
The characterization of storage firms as producers 
(i.e. hedgers) is new in the literature. It highlights an 
important channel through which futures influence spot 
prices. In Turnovsky(1983) the introduction of a futures 
market increases the price responsiveness of the supply 
curve, but leaves the inventory demand curve unchanged. In 
the model presented here, the introduction of a futures 
market works out its effect through a modification of 
storage behavior. Precisely the interaction between 




























































































different in magnitude in the futures and no-futures case, 
is the determinant of the conclusion on the futures 
stabilizing effect.
The investigation of the price volatility issue is 
done on a purely analytical ground and conclusions are 
consistent with those obtained by Kawai(1983b) in a 
numerical illustration of a similar model.
A welfare analysis of the price stabilization issue 
presented in this paper is not straightforward. It is 
therefore left for future research since the objective here 





























































































Appendix A: Equilibrium Solutions for the Model
The equilibrium prices are obtained conditional on the 
observation of xi=Yi< since spot and futures trading take 
place after the uncertainty on Y^ is resolved.
AI - Model without futures 
The equilibrium conditions are:
(Al) Dx + S = Yx
D2 = Yi + S where S=ns
Substituting (2) in AI, solving for p^ and substituting
back in (Al), with a bit of algebra the following
equilibrium prices are derived:
(ad'+2n)A n Yx (ad'+n)E(Y2)





(ad'+25n)A (ad'+SnJY^ 8n E(Y2)




(ad'+2n)A n Yi 1
(A4) p2 = ------------------------------Y2
a(ad'+8n+n) a(ad'+n8n) a
8n 8^n
+ -----------E(Y2) + ---------aCov (p2,p2y2/Y1)
a(ad'+n+8n) ad'+n+8n




























































































All - Model with Futures
The equilibrium conditions are:
D1 + S^ = Y-l
(A5) D2 = Y2 + Sf
Ff + Fs = 0
where the last equation corresponds to the unbiasedness
condition.
Substituting (5) in (A5), solving for p^f and substituting 
back in (A5), the following equilibrium prices are derived:
d 8n
(A6) p:f -------(A-Y!) + ----- E(p2f/Y1)
ad+n ad+n
(ad+2n)A (ad+n)E(Y2) n Yx
(A7) E(p2f/Y1) = --------------------------------------
a(ad+n+8n) a(ad+n+8n) a(ad+n+8n)
(ad+28n)A 8nE(Y2) (ad+8n)Y^
(A8) pxf = ---------------------------------------
a(ad+n+8n) a(ad+n+8n) a (ad+n+8n)
(ad+2n)A 1 n
(A9) p2f = -------------- Y2 + ------------ [8e (Y2) - YX]
a (ad+n+8n) a a(ad+n+8n)
AIII - The RE Cov(P9,p9y?/Y1)
The definition of covariance implies:
(A10) Cov(p2,p2y2/Y1)=E[(p2-E(p2/Yx)) (p2y2-E(p2y2/Y1))] 
Substituting (A2) and (A4) into (A10) , carrying out the 
necessary calculations and recalling the uncorrelation 































































































E(Y23)~e (Y2)E (Y22) (ad,+2n)A-nY1+SnE(Y2)
a2n ■ (ad1+n+5n)
In order to get the rational expectation expression for the 
covariance between period 2 prices and value of endowment, 
(All) is solved for Cov(p2,p2y2/Yl):
ad'+n+5n
(A12) Cov (p2,p2y2/Yl) = ----------------— — (E(Y23)
an[a(ad'+n+5n)+52aaY ]
(ad1+2n)A-nYl+SnE(Y2)
- E(Y2)E(Y22) + ---------------------- aY2
ad' +n+8n
or, by the properties of the moment generating function:
°Y2
(A13) Cov (P2,P2y2/Yl) = ----------------~--- ,~(nYl +an[a (ad1+n+8n)+8^aaY ]
[2 (ad'+n)+8n]E (Y2) - (ad'+2n)A)
which is just a function of the parameters of the model and 



























































































Appendix B: A More Formal Analysis of the Comparison
between Period 1 Price Variances
The two relevant terms for the comparison in (16') and
(17') can be represented by the following functions:
n2 2n
f (x, y) = ---------- x2 ---------x
(ay+n+8n)^ ay+n+5n
52aaY2
where x = (1  --------------- . --- hence 0<x<l.
a[a(ay+n+5n)+52aOy2
In order to get the two relevant terms in (17') we have to 
put x=l and y=d. For (16') instead we have that y=d'>d but 
x can take any value s.t. 0<x<l.
When Cov (P2/P2Y2) =0/ then x=l and |f(l,d')| < |f(l,d)|. Hence 
conclusions on period 1 price variability hold.
In general, since f(x,y) is monotonically decreasing in 
0<x<l, then
| f (x, d ') | < |f(l,d)| for any x s.t. 0<x4l.
Hence the conclusion holds for the non-zero covariance case 
too. This covariance introduces a further element of 
sensitivity of the period 1 price variance to in the no­






























































































Anderson, R.W. and J.-P. Danthine, 1983, "Hedger Diversity 
in Futures Markets", Economic Journal 93, 370-389.
Danthine, J-P., 1978, "Information, Futures Markets and
Stabilizing Speculation", Journal of Economic Theory 
17, 79-98.
Ghosh S., Gilbert C.L., Hughes Hallet A.J., 1987,
"Stabilizing Speculative Commodity Markets" (Clarendon 
Press, Oxford).
Goss, B.A., 1972, "The Theory of Futures Trading" 
(Routledge and Kegan Paul, London).
Kawai, H., 1983a, "Spot and Futures Prices of Nonstorable
Commodities under Rational Expectations", Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 98, 235-254.
Kawai, H., 1983b, "Price Volatility of Storable Commodities 
under Rational Expectations in Spot and Futures 
Markets", International Economic Review 24, 435-458.
Kawai, H., 1984, "The Effect of Forward Exchange on Spot
Rate Volatility under Risk and Rational Expectations", 
Journal of International Economics 16, 155-172.
Newbery, D.M., 1988, "On the Accuracy of the Mean-Variance 
Approximation for Futures Markets", Economic Letters 
28, 63-68.
Newbery, D.M.G., and J.E. Stiglitz, 1981, "The Theory of 
Commodity Price Stabilization", (Oxford University 
Press, Oxford).
Torricelli, C., 1988, "An Investigation in the Theory of
Futures Markets", M.Phil. Thesis, University of 
Warwick, Department of Economics.
Torricelli, C., 1989a, "La Teoria dei Mercati Futures:
Scorte, Variabilità dei Prezzi e Tassi di Cambio", 
Doctoral Thesis, University of Bologna, Economics 
Department, published as "Studi e Ricerche del 
Dipartimento di Economia Politica", Università di 
Modena, n.54.
Torricelli, C., 1989, "A Survey in the Theory of Futures
Markets", Ricerche Economiche 4, 81-106.
Turnovsky, S.J., 1979, "Futures Markets, Private Storage





























































































Turnovsky, S.J., 1983, "The Determination of Spot and
Futures Prices with Storable Commodities", 
Econometrica 51, 1363-1388.
Turnovsky, S.J., and R.B. Campbell, 1985, "The Stabilizing 
and Welfare Properties of Futures Markets: a
simulation Approach", International Economic Review 
26, 277-303.
Williams, J., 1986, "The Economic Function of Futures






























































































EUI Working Papers are published and distributed by the 
European University Institute, Florence
Copies can be obtained free of charge -  depending on the availability of
stocks -  from:
The Publications Officer 
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana
1-50016 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) 
Italy



























































































Publications of the European University Institute
To The Publications Officer
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana
1-50016 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) 
Italy
From Name . , 
Address
□  Please send me a complete list o f EUI Working Papers
□  Please send me a complete list of EUI book publications
□  Please send me the EUI brochure Academic Year 1990/91





































































































W orking Papers of the D epartm ent of Econom ics 
Published since 1989
8 9 /3 7 0
B. BENSAID/RJ. GARY-BOBO/
S. FEDERBUSCH
The Strategic Aspects of Profit Sharing in the 
Industry
8 9 /3 7 4
Francisco S. TORRES
Small Countries and Exogenous Policy Shocks 
8 9 /3 7 5
Renzo DAVIDDI
Rouble Convertibility: A Realistic Target 
8 9 /3 7 7
Elettra AGLIARDI
On the Robustness of Contestability Theory 
8 9 /3 7 8
Stephen MARTIN
The Welfare Consequences of Transaction Costs 
in Financial Markets
8 9 /3 8 1
Susan SENIOR NELLO
Recent Developments in Relations Between the
EC and Eastern Europe
8 9 /3 8 2
Jean GABSZEWICZ/ Paolo GARELLA/ 
Charles NOLLET
Spatial Price Competition With Uninformed 
Buyers
8 9 /3 8 3  
Benedetto GUI
Beneficiary and Dominant Roles in 
Organizations: The Case of Nonprofits
8 9 /3 8 4
Agusti'n MARAVALL/ Daniel PENA 
Missing Observations, Additive Outliers and 
Inverse Autocorrelation Function
8 9 /3 8 5
Stephen MARTIN
Product Differentiation and Market Performance 
in Oligopoly
8 9 /3 8 6  
Dalia MARIN
Is the Export-Led Growth Hypothesis Valid for 
Industrialized Countries?
8 9 /3 8 7
Stephen MARTIN
Modeling Oligopolistic Interaction
8 9 /3 8 8
Jean-Claude CHOURAQUI
The Conduct of Monetary Policy: What have we
Learned From Recent Experience
8 9 /3 9 0
Corrado BENASSI
Imperfect Information and Financial Markets: A 
General Equilibrium Model
8 9 /3 9 4
Serge-Christophe KOLM 
Adequacy, Equity and Fundamental Dominance: 
Unanimous and Comparable Allocations in 
Rational Social Choice, with Applications to 
Marriage and Wages
8 9 /3 9 5
Daniel HEYMANN/ Axel LEUONHUFVUD 
On the Use of Currency Reform in Inflation 
Stabilization
8 9 /4 0 0
Robert J. GARY-BOBO
On the Existence of Equilibrium Configurations
in a Class of Asymmetric Market Entry Games *
8 9 /4 0 2
Stephen MARTIN
Direct Foreign Investment in The United States 
8 9 /4 1 3
Francisco S. TORRES
Portugal, the EMS and 1992: Stabilization and 
Liberalization
8 9 /4 1 6
Joerg MAYER
Reserve Switches and Exchange-Rate Variability: 
The Presumed Inherent Instability of the 
Multiple Reserve-Currency System
8 9 /4 1 7
José P. ESPERANÇA/ Neil KAY 
Foreign Direct Investment and Competition in 
the Advertising Sector: The Italian Case



























































































8 9 /4 1 8
Luigi BRIGHI/ Mario FORNI
Aggregation Across Agents in Demand Systems
8 9 /4 2 0
Corrado BEN ASS I
A Competitive Model of Credit Intermediation 
8 9 /4 2 2
Marcus MILLER/ Mark SALMON 
When does Coordination pay?
8 9 /4 2 3
Marcus MILLER/ Mark SALMON/
Alan SUTHERLAND
Time Consistency, Discounting and the Returns 
to Cooperation
8 9 /4 2 4
Frank CRITCHLEY/ Paul MARRIOTT/
Mark SALMON
On the Differential Geometry of the Wald Test 
with Nonlinear Restrictions
8 9 /4 2 5
Peter J. HAMMOND
On the Impossibility of Perfect Capital Markets 
8 9 /4 2 6
Peter J. HAMMOND
Perfected Option Markets in Economies with 
Adverse Selection
8 9 /4 2 7
Peter J. HAMMOND
Irreducibility, Resource Relatedness, and Survival 
with Individual Non-Convexities
* * *
EC O  No. 90/1**
Tamer BA£AR and Mark SALMON 
Credibility and the Value of Information 
Transmission in a Model of Monetary Policy 
and Inflation
EC O  No. 90/2
Horst UNGERER
The EMS -  The First Ten Years
Policies -  Developments -  Evolution
EC O  No. 90/3 
Peter J. HAMMOND
Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility: Why and 
how they are and should be made
ECO  No. 90/4 
Peter J. HAMMOND
A Revelation Principle for (Boundedly) Bayesian 
Rationalizable Strategies
ECO  No. 90/5 
Peter J. HAMMOND 
Independence of Irrelevant Interpersonal 
Comparisons
ECO  No. 90/6 
Hal R. VAR I AN
A Solution to the Problem of Externalities and 
Public Goods when Agents are Well-Informed
ECO  No. 90/7 
Hal R. VARIAN
Sequential Provision of Public Goods 
ECO  No. 90/8
T. BRIANZA, L. PHLIPS and J.F. RICHARD 
Futures Markets, Speculation and Monopoly 
Pricing
ECO  No. 90/9
Anthony B. ATKINSON/John
MICKLEWRIGHT
Unemployment Compensation and Labour 
Market Transition: A Critical Review
ECO  No. 90/10
Peter J. HAMMOND
The Role of Information in Economics
ECO No. 90/11
Nicos M. CHRISTODOULAKIS 
Debt Dynamics in a Small Open Economy
ECO  No. 90/12 
Stephen C. SMITH
On the Economic Rationale for Codetermination 
Law
ECO  No. 90/13 
Elettra AGLIARDI
Learning by Doing and Market Structures
ECO  No. 90/14 
Peter J. HAMMOND 
Intertemporal Objectives
ECO  No. 90/15 
Andrew EVANS/Stephen MARTIN 
Socially Acceptable Distortion of Competition: 
EC Policy on State Aid
Please note: As from January 1990, the EUI 
Working Papers Series is divided into six sub-series, each 
series will be numbered individually (e.g. EUI Working 
Paper LAW No. 90/1).



























































































E C O  No. 90/16 
Stephen MARTIN 
Fringe Size and Cartel Stability
E C O  No. 90/17
John MICKLEWRICiHT
W hy Do Less Than a Quarter of the
Unemployed in Britain Receive Unemployment
Insurance?
E C O  N o. 90/18 
Mrudula A. PATEL 
Optimal Life Cycle Saving 
With Borrowing Constraints:
A Graphical Solution
E C O  N o. 90/19 
Peter J. HAMMOND
Money Metric Measures of Individual and Social 
Welfare Allowing for Environmental 
Externalities
E C O  No. 90/20 
Louis PHLIPS/
Ronald M. HARSTAD
Oligopolistic Manipulation of Spot Markets and 
the Timing o f Futures Market Speculation
E C O  No. 90/21
Christian DUSTMANN
Earnings Adjustment of Temporary Migrants
E C O  No. 90/22
John MICKLEWRICiHT
The Reform o f Unemployment Compensation:
Choices for East and West
E C O  N o. 90/23 
Joerg MAYER
U. S. Dollar and Deutschmark as Reserve Assets
E C O  No. 90/24 
Sheila MARNIE
Labour Market Reform in the USSR:
Fact or Fiction?
E C O  N o. 90/25 
Peter JENSEN/
Niels WESTERGARD-NIELSEN 
Temporary Layoffs and the Duration of 
Unemployment An Empirical Analysis
E C O  N o. 90/26 
Stephan L. KALB
Market-Led Approaches to European Monetary 
Union in the Light of a Legal Restrictions 
Theory o f Money
E C O  No. 90/27 
Robert J.W ALDM ANN 
Implausible Results o r Implausible Data? 
Anomalies in the Construction o f Value Added 
Data and Implications for Estimates o f Price- 
Cost Markups
EC O  No. 90/28 
Stephen MARTIN
Periodic Model Changes in Oligopoly
EC O  No. 90/29
Nicos CHRISTODOULAKIS/
Martin WEALE
Imperfect Competition in an Open Economy
*  *  *
ECO  No. 91/30 
Steve ALPERN/Dennis J. SNOWER 
Unemployment Through ‘Learning From 
Experience’
EC O  No. 91/31
David M. PRESCOTT/Thanasis STENGOS 
Testing for Forecastible Nonlinear Dependence 
in Weekly Gold Rates o f Return
EC O  No. 91/32 
Peter J. HAMMOND 
Harsanyi’s Utilitarian Theorem:
A Simpler Proof and Some Ethical 
Connotations
EC O  No. 91/33 
Anthony B. ATKINSON/
John MICKLEWRIGHT
Economic Transformation in Eastern Europe
and the Distribution o f Income
ECO  No. 91/34 
Svend ALBAEK
On Nash and Stackclbcrg Equilibria when Costs 
are Private Information
ECO No. 91/35 
Stephen MARTIN 
Private and Social Incentives 
to Form R & D Joint Ventures
ECO  No. 91/36 
Louis PHLIPS
Manipulation o f Crude Oil Futures 
ECO  No. 91/37
Xavier CALSAMIGLIA/Alan KIR MAN 
A Unique Informationally Efficient and 
Decentralized Mechanism With Fair Outcomes



























































































E C O  No. 91/3*
George S. ALOGOSKOUFIS/
Thanasis STENGOS
Testing for Nonlinear Dynamics in Historical 
Unemployment Series
E C O  No. 91/39 
Peter J. HAMMOND
The Moral Status of Profits and Other Rewards: 
A Perspective From Modern Welfare Economies
E C O  No. 91/40
Vincent BROUSSEAU/Alan KIRMAN 
The Dynamics o f Learning 
in Mis-Specified Models
E C O  No. 91/41
Robert James WALDMANN
Assessing the Relative Sizes of Industry- and
Nation Specific Shocks to Output
E C O  No. 91/42
Thorsten HENS/Alan KIRMAN/Louis PHLIPS 
Exchange Rates and Oligopoly
E C O  No. 91/43 
Peter J. HAMMOND 
Consequential ist Decision Theory and 
Utilitarian Ethics
E C O  No. 91/44 
Stephen MARTIN
Endogenous Firm Efficiency in a  Cournot 
Principal-Agent Model
E C O  No. 91/45 
Svend ALBAEK
Upstream or Downstream Information Sharing?
E C O  No. 91/46
Thomas H. McCURDY/
Thanasis STENGOS
A Comparison o f Risk-Premium Forecasts 
Implied by Parametric Versus Nonparametric 
Conditional Mean Estimators
E C O  No. 91/47 
Christian DUSTMANN 
Temporary Migration and the Investment into 
Human Capital
E C O  No. 91/48 
Jean-Daniel GUIGOU
Should Bankruptcy Proceedings be Initiated by a 
Mixed Credilor/Shareholder?
E C O  No. 91/49 
Nick VRIEND
Market-Making and Decentralized Trade
E C O  No. 91/50
Jeffrey L. COLES/Peter J. HAMMOND 
Walrasian Equilibrium without Survival: 
Existence, Efficiency, and Remedial Policy
E C O  No. 91/51
Frank CRITCHLEY/Paul MARRIOTT/
Mark SALMON
Preferred Point Geometry and Statistical 
Manifolds
EC O  No. 91/52 
Costanza TORRICELLI 
The Influence of Futures on Spot Price 
Volatility in a Model for a Storable Commodity
Working Paper out of print
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
